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1.  THE EC-US TRADE RELATIONSHIP: BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND 
INTERDEPENDENCE 
 
  Since the 1950s, the European Community (EC)1 has been trying to build up a 
new independent legal and economic order.  This exercise has been difficult and gradual.  
Indeed, each step forward in the build-up of the Community's legal and economic order 
requires a new compromise formula between the member states--for example, between 
the free traders and the economic interventionists; between the more service-oriented, the 
more industrial-oriented, and the more agricultural economies; and between the richer 
and the poorer regions.  Obviously, the Community is not developing in a vacuum.  Since 
the Community is a major player in international trade relations, its development has an 
effect, not only within the EC, but also on third countries.  Naturally, since Community 
measures also affect third countries, those third countries, including the United States 
(US), have been trying to influence or even control the final shape of the EC's legal and 
economic order.  As Jeffrey Garten, the US Under Secretary of Commerce for 
International Trade, has recently explained, the US is determined to try and shape its 
trading partners' economic system in view of the US market opening objective.  
According to Garten, Washington would use its power to try to pry open markets even if 
it meant challenging "the very industrial organization of countries" (cited in Friedman, 
1995). 
 
  As a result, tension has developed between, on the one hand, the EC's sovereign 
right to set up its own legal order and, on the other, the outside world's interest in 
monitoring and influencing the EC's development.  This paper examines this tension as it 
arises in the relationship between the Community and the United States.  More 
specifically, the paper deals with the institutional strategies (multilateral, bilateral, and 
unilateral) used by the United States to monitor the EC's development and to keep the 
Common Market open for US exports.  The main question is how far each of the 
institutional strategies was able to help resolve, or better, help prevent, "market opening" 
conflicts between the US and the EC.   At the end of the paper, the current US market 
opening options toward the EC will be analyzed, including the recent suggestion to create 
a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) similar to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). 
   
2.  THE US AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON MARKET OPENING 
   For the Clinton Administration, market opening abroad has been a main feature 
of US foreign policy.  This is not surprising.  Even during his election campaign, Bill 
Clinton emphasized this theme (Clinton and Gore, 1992).  As US Trade Representative 
Mickey Kantor explained before Congress:  "Past Administrations have often neglected 
US economic and trading interests because of foreign policy or defense concerns."  
However, he added, "The days when we could afford to do so are long past.  In the post-
Cold War order, our national security depends on our economic strength" (Kantor, 
1993a).  Moreover, the Clinton Administration has become convinced that it will only be 
able to sustain a growing US economy through an expansion of trade.  Trade is regarded 
as the 'engine' that should 'drive economic recovery and job growth'.  In Kantor's words:  
"for every billion dollars in exports, 15,000 jobs are created" (Kantor, 1993b). 
 
  Inspired by the current passion for market opening, some observers have 
accused past US policy-makers of having either overlooked the commercial dangers 
inherent in the creation of a European economic block or 'sacrificed' US commercial 
interests for Cold War purposes (see Gilpin, 1971; Laurent, 1989; Zupnick, 1989).  This 
is inaccurate.  The active US encouragement of European integration after the Second 
World War was, obviously, strongly influenced by the geo-political Cold War interests of 
the United States (Winand, 1993).  US policy-makers also knew that European economic 
unification would affect US trade interests.  During the formation of the Community, US 
economists warned that the establishment of a European customs union, implying the 
creation of a common customs tariff surrounding the union, would inevitably lead to 
some trade diversion. 
 
  Contrary to current allegations, the Eisenhower Administration did not see its 
support for European economic integration as an economic 'sacrifice' that was made for 
purely political Cold War reasons.  Washington looked upon the EC as an economic 
'investment' that was expected to boost Western Europe's economic growth and thereby 
stimulate demand for American products (for a more detailed treatment, see Devuyst, 
1992a).  As Clarence B. Randall, the Chairman of the President's Council on Foreign 
Economic Policy, reported in 1956, "most United States officials. . . believe the 
advantages to the United States of European integration through a customs union . . . far 
outweigh any possible disadvantages both on economic and political grounds."  
According to Randall, US policy-makers "recognized that economic integration would 
result in tariff discrimination against United States exports."  Still, they also "argued that 
the United States would be far more likely to obtain a liberal trade policy (including a 
dismantling of dollar restrictions) from a strong, unified European economy than from 
the smaller, less efficient economies as they now exist."  Furthermore, it was generally 
agreed "that if the purpose of economic integration was achieved--higher productivity 
and rising standards of living--Europe would become a better market for United States 
products" (Randall, 1956a, 24). 
 
  The Eisenhower Administration relied on the mechanisms of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade--the GATT--to foster the outward-looking orientation of 
the newly created Community.  The US Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon, for 
instance, specifically launched the so-called Dillon Round in the GATT "to keep the Community's common tariff as low as possible" (Dillon, 1957, 914).  Since the 1970s, the 
US has become much more skeptical about the consequences of European integration and 
much more sensitive about foreign trade barriers (for an analysis, see Peterson, 1971; 
Williams, 1971).  In order to understand this shift, it is essential to examine the evolution 
of the international economic position of the United States itself.  During the 1950s, when 
the Community was created, the US did not need to be very sensitive about foreign trade 
barriers.  The Eisenhower Administration could, indeed, look at international trade from 
the perspective of a largely 'closed' economy.  The impact of imports and exports on the 
US economy was very limited.  Also, the trade account was showing a surplus.  By the 
1970s, however, the contribution of international trade to the US economy had increased 
markedly, from 7 percent of US GDP after the Second World War to almost 20 percent.  
Moreover, starting in  the early 1970s, the US trade surplus of the 1950s and 1960s had 
turned into a widening trade deficit.  These two factors increased the pressure on 
Congress and the Administration to push more aggressively for short-term market 
opening abroad (Destler, 1992).  In addition, the Community's own evolution led to 
problems for the US.  During the 1960s, the EC worked out its Common Agricultural 
Policy, based on the 'Community preference principle'.   
 
  The protectionist Common Agricultural Policy prevented the highly competitive 
US farm sector from flooding the European market with American agricultural products 
(although the agricultural trade balance between US and EC has always been positive for 
the US).  Moreover, the EC started surrounding itself with preferential trade agreements 
that also seemed to hinder US exports, not only to the Common Market itself, but also to 
third markets.  In institutional terms, the increasing market opening pressures gave rise to 
a multi-track US trade policy--one that no longer limited itself to reliance on multilateral 
GATT procedures, but also included bilateralism and even aggressive unilateralism based 
on Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Preeg, 1989; Baldwin, 1990; Pearson and 
Riedel, 1990).  Washington's multi-track approach will now be illustrated by looking at 
some of the institutional trade strategies that the United States has developed to monitor 
the Community's development and to keep the Common Market open for US exports.  
The broad GATT negotiating rounds will not be examined here since they go well 
beyond the specific US monitoring of EC trade practices. 
 
 
3.  US MARKET OPENING STRATEGIES TOWARD THE EC: THE PRE-
URUGUAY ROUND EXPERIENCE 
 
3.1.  The Multilateral Approach:  GATT Customs Union Procedures 
 
  When the European Economic Community was founded in 1957, the 
Eisenhower Administration assumed that the US was in a strong bargaining position to 
eliminate all possible barriers to American exports.  "As you know," wrote Clarence 
Randall to the Secretary of State, "we hold an indirect veto over [the creation of the EEC] 
because the consent of the GATT will be required" (Randall, 1956b, 469).  Indeed, 
according to GATT article XXIV, the formation of customs unions and free trade areas is 
subject to multilateral scrutiny.  Under Article XXIV, customs unions such as the Community must meet two essential criteria.  Internally, customs unions must lead to the 
abolition of barriers to "substantially all trade" between members of the Union.  
Externally, customs unions must maintain a single common customs tariff and 
substantially the same regulations of commerce toward third countries.  The external 
tariff and regulations should "not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the 
general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable" prior to the 
formation of the customs union in question. 
 
  To ensure that new or enlarged customs unions adhere to these criteria, Article 
XXIV includes specific monitoring procedures.  First, new or enlarged customs unions 
must be examined by a Working Party, composed of delegates from the GATT 
contracting parties.  The Working Party is to check whether the customs union conforms 
with the requirements of Article XXIV.  Second, new or enlarged customs unions must 
enter into bilateral negotiations that provide for compensatory adjustment for third 
countries when bound tariffs3 have been raised in the formation or adaptation of the 
common customs tariff.  Both procedures are currently being used in relation to the EC's 
enlargement to include Austria, Finland and Sweden.  The US has naturally tried to make 
use of these procedures to keep the Common Market open for American products, both 
following the original creation of the EC and after each enlargement.  Ideally, the GATT 
procedures under Article XXIV should work as an 'early warning system' that should 
enable the contracting parties to spot possible problems regarding regional trade 
arrangements in a timely manner and should enable the GATT to recommend changes. 
 
  Historically, however, the Article XXIV process has been plagued by several 
problems (see Devuyst, 1992b for a more detailed explanation of the legal and technical 
problems).  Invariably, application of the procedure has resulted in ugly fights between 
the EC and the US.  To start with, the bilateral compensatory adjustment negotiations 
between the EC and third countries were hindered by important methodological 
problems, whereby each party constantly tried to advance trade figures sustaining its 
point of view.  On the occasion of the compensatory adjustment negotiations regarding 
the admission of Spain and Portugal, differences of view between the US and the EC on 
the agricultural consequences of the accession led to the brink of a trade war.  The GATT 
Working Party examinations have never led to formal conclusions on the compatibility of 
the EC with the GATT due to persistent differences of view between the contracting 
parties.  The consensus decision-making requirements of the GATT obstructed resolution 
of these differences and allowed the Community to prevent the adoption of formal GATT 
requests for changes to Community rules (which themselves formed an essential part of 
an internal deal between the EC's member states). 
 
  Further, the Article XXIV procedures have not functioned as effective 'early 
warning systems' for at least three reasons.  First, the pre-Uruguay Rounds of GATT 
were limited to trade in goods.  The Community's integration process, however, went 
well beyond the GATT's limited scope.  For instance, 60 percent of the EC's GNP is the 
result of service transactions.  While the EC tried to regulate the service sector, this was 
not covered by the old GATT.  Secondly, only the creation and enlargement of the EC 
were examined under Article XXIV.  The latter was silent on the sometimes more important substantive issue of 'deepening' in European integration (for example, the 
creation of new European economic law).  Finally, Article XXIV review only took place 
after the Community had finished its internal decision-making.  Changing Community 
rules after the EC had achieved an internal consensus was bound to be difficult.  Similar 
problems have plagued the examination of practically all other regional trade agreements 
under GATT Article XXIV.  Indeed, only four minor regional trade agreements have 
been formally accepted by the contracting parties as being compatible with the GATT. 
 
3.2  The Multilateral Approach: GATT Dispute Settlement 
 
  When the US wanted to change a Community policy in order to effect market 
opening, it frequently relied on the GATT dispute settlement process.  This process is 
specifically designed to resolve trade disputes over issues included in the GATT's 
multilateral framework.  Obviously, it could only be used in disputes where the US 
believed that benefits due to it under the GATT had been nullified or impaired by the 
EC's practices.  With regard to the more complex cases, the dispute settlement 
mechanism was also characterized by problem points (see Devuyst, 1994 for details).  
Indeed, since GATT conflict resolution also worked by consensus, it provided the parties 
in a dispute with the opportunity to block or hinder the smooth functioning of the dispute 
settlement process.  In the case of the EC's ban on hormones in meat, for instance, the EC 
simply stopped the creation of a dispute settlement panel, which would normally be 
composed of three or five trade policy experts.  In other cases, such as the Mediterranean 
citrus preferences conflict, the EC refused to adopt the report issued by the panel, thus 
depriving the panel report of legally binding force.  The EC made use of this opportunity 
to safeguard, as much as possible, the Community's existing internal equilibrium, 
especially in the 'difficult' cases where a panel ruling would have forced the Community 
to change a delicate internal compromise between the member states. 
 
  It must be noted that the US, too, has been blocking the dispute brought before 
the GATT by the US against the EC's export subsidies on wheat flour.  The US refused to 
accept the panel report since it did not rule against Community practices.  Because of the 
consensus practice, some GATT dispute settlement cases could never start.  Several 
others never officially ended.  In fact, a detailed analysis of all GATT dispute settlement 
cases started by the US against the EC shows that none of the 'difficult' conflicts (i.e., 
conflicts where the EC perceived that the withdrawal of the practices objected to by the 
US would seriously upset the Community's internal balance) were or could be resolved 
simply on the basis of a panel report.  In each of these cases, the resolution of the dispute 
demanded lengthy political negotiations, including the creation of broad packages of 
mutually beneficial concessions between the US and the EC.  Resolution also entailed the 
promise of internal economic compensation within the EC for the member state or 
economic sector that would be 'harmed' by the concessions made to the US. 
 
3.3  The Bilateral Approach:  The US and the Creation of the Internal Market 
 
  When the Community initiated its Internal Market project in the mid-1980s, it 
soon became clear that its development could not be effectively examined under the GATT.  First, as was said before, the qualitative 'deepening' or rule-making of the EC 
was not subject to any systematic and timely scrutiny under GATT's customs union 
procedures.  Secondly, many of the internal market directives dealt with services 
transactions which were not covered by the pre-Uruguay Round GATT.  In order to 
influence the internal market's creation, the US set up its own interagency 'early warning' 
and negotiation mechanism (Devuyst, 1989; Peterson, Green Cowles and Devuyst, 1995).  
For US purposes, this monitoring system offered several advantages, compared to the 
Article XXIV mechanism.  The deepening process could be examined in all its aspects, 
including services.  Also, the US could make its views heard in time--that is, during the 
EC's decision-making process, rather than after the fact.  In its initial internal market 
projects, the Community largely neglected the external dimension (Eeckhout, 1991).  
After timely consultations with the US, however, the EC did make a number of changes 
to its initial drafts.  The original mirror-image reciprocity test in the Commission's initial 
proposal for the second banking directive, for example, was changed to accommodate US 
demands.  While not all disputes concerning the internal market were settled in a similar 
way--remember the yet unresolved audio visual services conflict--the bilateral 
mechanism nevertheless proved useful as a way to tackle effectively a number of 
potential conflicts before they could escalate.  Of the 280 internal market measures 
adopted by the EC, only two led to the initiation of unilateral 'trade war' procedures by 
the US.  But the bilateral nature of the consultations over the internal market sometimes 
proved problematic from the EC's point of view.  While the EC was ready to enter into 
consultations, it was not ready to consider 'a 13th seat at the table' for the United States, 
as had been requested by US Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher. 
 
3.4  The Unilateral Approach: The Application of Sanction Threats Under Section 
301 
 
  In addition to and during multilateral procedures and bilateral negotiations, the 
US has since the mid-1980s also actively resorted to unilateral retaliation against the EC, 
under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended.  This procedure was often 
invoked after a dispute had been blocked in the GATT dispute settlement framework and 
was used to obtain short-term changes in EC trade practices (for a detailed analysis, see 
Devuyst, 1994; Bayard and Elliott, 1994).  From a US perspective, unilateral retaliation 
did seem to offer a number of advantages.  Most importantly, in contrast with the GATT 
procedures, the US could decide, without outside interference, when to impose sanctions.  
Such sanctions tended to weaken the negotiating position of the Community by 
increasing the complexity of the dispute.  In view of the frequent differences of opinion 
between the EC's member states regarding trade policy, the Community often appeared 
relatively defenseless during dynamic trade conflicts demanding swift action and 
reaction.  Also, by targeting the sanctions against a specific member state or a particular 
product, the US hoped to sharpen the interest of that member state or economic sector in 
a quick resolution of the dispute (see Brand, 1993, for the functions of Section 301 during 
a GATT dispute settlement case). 
 
  It is crucial to add, though, that even real sanctions under Section 301 were 
usually insufficient simply to settle a conflict with the Community to the advantage of the United States.  Getting the approval of the EC's Council of Ministers for a substantial 
change in a significant Community policy always required political negotiations, beyond 
sanctions and beyond GATT dispute settlement.  Even in the presence of an effective 
sanction threat, a double bargain was necessary to settle complex disputes.  Firstly, 
conflict resolution required the negotiation of balanced package deals between the EC 
and the US.  Secondly, obtaining the Member States' approval for changes in important 
Community policies in turn required internal bargains within the EC.  Member States 
whose economic sectors were expected to suffer as a result of the change in policy often 
had to be 'bribed' by way of specific financial or economic compensation within the 
Community.  For example, in the conflict over Mediterranean citrus fruit preferences, the 
US decided to impose trade sanctions against EC pasta, and the Community retaliated.  
The dispute was settled only after the US recognized the political importance of the 
Community's Mediterranean policy and only after an exchange of trade concessions 
which included a cut in EC import levies and a reduction in US tariffs on products of 
interest to the EC.  Moreover, the EC's Council of Ministers decided to approve the 
compromise only after the Commission had pledged to use its agricultural management 
powers to prevent the deal from causing "inequitable consequences for Community 
producers." 
 
  The concessions offered by the EC to settle the conflict over agriculture arising 
from the accession of Spain and Portugal (another case in which Section 301 sanctions 
were used) could only be made final as part of the Uruguay Round deal.  Only in that 
broad framework could permanent concessions by the EC be accepted as having been 
balanced against US concessions in other areas.  In addition, the final solution was only 
agreed to by the Council after a promise of additional internal financial assistance to the 
EC's farmers, if the consequences of the deal went beyond the reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy decided in 1992 (see Devuyst, 1995, for more evidence).  Unilateral 
sanctions thus seemed only one element in the complex negotiation games.  Sanctions on 
their own would not, apparently, have led to a solution.  Unilateral sanctions did not seem 
to contribute in other cases to a settlement at all.  For instance, in the hormones dispute, 
the introduction after 1989 of unilateral Section 301 sanctions changed nothing in the 
substance of the conflict.  For the EC, the ban on hormones in meat, presented as an 
essential health and consumer protection measure, could not be traded away, even in the 
face of sanctions.  Also, in the telecom procurement dispute, US unilateral retaliation 
only seemed to make it psychologically more difficult for the Community to reach a 
compromise with the US.  Indeed, Commission Vice President Leon Brittan said that "the 
unjustified US sanctions" would not make the Commission change its negotiating 
position "one iota" (Brittan, 1993). 
 
4.  THE US - EC TRADE RELATIONSHIP IN THE POST-URUGUAY 
ROUND WORLD 
 
4.1.  The New Multilateral Framework:  The World Trade Organization 
 
  During the Uruguay Round, the negotiators tried to eliminate the institutional 
problem points which had characterized the GATT mechanisms reviewed in this paper.  In particular, the Uruguay Round produced an Understanding which was meant to clarify 
interpretation of Article XXIV.  While it might have helped to resolve some of the 
methodological points of contention, the Understanding included few substantive 
innovations.  Also, it certainly did not turn the Article XXIV process into an effective 
'early warning' instrument with regard to regional trade arrangements.  Nevertheless, the 
Uruguay Round may have helped multilateral supervision of the Community.  First, it 
extended the scope of the multilateral trade system to such areas as trade in services 
(General Agreement on Trade in Services--GATS) and intellectual property protection 
(Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights--TRIPs).  Article V 
of GATS, entitled 'Economic Integration', includes a procedure that is rather similar to 
that of GATT Article XXIV.  Secondly, the Round established a World Trade 
Organization (the WTO) as the common institutional framework governing GATT, 
GATS and TRIPs.  The WTO will try to maintain the consensus decision-making which 
was to typical of the GATT.   However, the agreement also stipulates that, where it is 
impossible to reach a consensus, majority decisions can be taken.  In the past, the 
Community was able to avoid formal problems in the Article XXIV process precisely 
because of the consensus rule.  Thirdly, the Uruguay Round Agreement confirmed the 
establishment of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) which had been set up on 
a provisional basis during the Round.  The TRPM provides for the regular multilateral 
examination of the trade policies of the WTO members, including the EC.  Finally, there 
is the streamlined multilateral dispute settlement system.  Under the new Uruguay Round 
rules, the parties to a dispute will no longer be able to prevent the conflict resolution 
system from functioning properly.  Parties which do not implement dispute settlement 
rulings will have to pay compensation or face sanctions.  At the same time, WTO rules 
explicitly prohibit the unilateral suspension of concessions or other obligations under the 
relevant agreements in retaliation against the trade practices of other members. 
 
  These streamlined and sharpened procedures could, depending on their use in 
practice, have an important effect on the multilateral supervision of the EC.  
Nevertheless, the new procedures still do not function as effective 'early warning 
mechanisms', since they operate only after the Community has already taken its 
decisions.  The new multilateral provisions do not, in fact,  fundamentally alter the EC's 
internal political and economic difficulties whenever the Community needs to change 
existing rules or an established compromise among the member states.  As pre-Uruguay 
Round experience showed, neither GATT panel reports, nor effective sanctions were 
enough to settle complex disputes.  Whenever the US asks for a change to a Community 
policy that rests on a delicate internal balance between the interests of the member states, 
the pragmatic search for a compromise formula, including external linkages and internal 
compensatory measures, must remain an important part of US-EC conflict management.  
A more aggressive use of the streamlined dispute settlement system or of the majority 
voting possibility under the WTO, without regard for the internal balances within the 
Community, could well lead to crises both within the EC and between the EC and the 
WTO. 
 
  From the point of view of the Community, the WTO also implies a number of 
important institutional changes.  First and formally, the Community has become a founding member of the WTO.  In the pre-Uruguay Round GATT, the Commission 
represented the EC's member states, but the EC as such had never become a formal 
contracting party.  Secondly (and politically more important), the EC faces a serious 
threat of fragmentation in the WTO.  In the 'old' GATT, there was never any doubt that 
the EC, under Article 113 of the EC Treaty, had exclusive competence to act with regard 
to trade in goods.  As a result, the EC was forced to come up with a common position that 
was expressed by the Commission.  The obligation to speak with one voice made the 
Community a significant player during international trade negotiations.   
 
  Discussions on the Community's representation within the WTO, however, 
indicate a hesitation on the part of several member states to move forward in the direction 
of unity in external representation.  Since the European Court of Justice stated, in an 
Opinion delivered on 15 November 1994, that the member states and the Community are 
jointly competent to deal with the 'new' GATS and TRIPs issues, some member states 
have taken the position that, in the absence of a consensus, each of them should be able to 
take the floor during multilateral GATS and TRIPs discussions.  In order to prevent the 
Community's unity of external representation from being undermined, a Code of Conduct 
on the EC's representation in the WTO is currently being negotiated between the member 
states and the Commission (see Bourgeois, 1994). 
 
4.2.  Continuing Reliance on Unilateral Market Opening Instruments 
 
  Despite the new dispute settlement system's explicit prohibition of unilateral 
sanctions against products covered by the WTO's multilateral agreements, the Clinton 
Administration seems determined to pursue its market opening strategy with the help of 
Section 301 wherever the latter is deemed to advance the US position.  The unilateral 
sanction threat in the case of alleged Japanese discrimination against US autos and auto 
parts is a recent example.  As Jeffrey Garten stated, "the United States [is] not prepared to 
wait for years for the World Trade Organization to open markets by acting to settle 
disputes" (Friedman, 1995).  Two reasons might be advanced to explain the continuing 
insistence on short-term market opening.  First, the fundamental economic reasons for a 
more aggressive trade policy have not undergone any spectacular change.  The US still 
faces a trade deficit, while the impact of international trade on the domestic economy can 
no longer be neglected.  Secondly, the end of the Cold War has brought about change in 
world politics.  Michael Aho and Bruce Stokes describe this change as follows:  "In the 
past, foreign economic objectives were often subordinated to security concerns in a desire 
not to alienate allies.  But without the constraint of the Cold War, America will not be as 
reluctant to aggressively pursue its economic goals.  At the same time, it will have less 
leverage because Europe and Japan are less reliant on US military protection.  As a result, 
a more assertive America will confront a more assertive world; a prescription for 
confrontation" (Aho and Stokes, 1991, 160-161).  The conclusion is similar to that in the 
previous section of this paper.  Pre-Uruguay Round experience has shown that, in 
conflicts where the internal balance of the Community is at stake, unilateral sanctions are 
no panacea.  Complex disputes with the EC can only be resolved on the basis of mutually 
beneficial compromise formulas and will often require internal compensatory adjustment 
within the EC to 'bribe' those member states who can expect to suffer from the deal.  
4.3.  Reinforced Bilateralism:  Toward TAFTA? 
 
  Bilateral EU-US trade policy contacts remain useful for two important reasons.  
First, neither the new WTO framework nor the unilateral option provide for an effective 
'early warning' mechanism with respect to potential trade conflicts.  Since both parties 
have experienced the value of timely discussion on problem points (notably during the 
creation of the internal market), the EC and the US have decided after the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round to set up a bilateral 'early warning system' at sub-cabinet level.  
Second, the new and expanded WTO framework does not yet cover the full range of 
international trade issues.  The absence of a comprehensive set of binding multilateral 
rules on competition policy or anti-trust law, for instance, is an important gap.  Bilateral 
accords, such as the EU-US Competition Agreement, can fill the gaps left by the 
multilateral system and provide a stepping stone for further WTO initiatives. 
 
  In addition to the negotiation of specific bilateral trade agreements, attempts 
have been made to develop a broader basis for bilateral EU-US consultation and 
cooperation.  During 1989-1990, the Bush Administration initiated several proposals for 
a 'New Atlantism' (Baker, 1989).  The Administration feared the development of an 
'insular' or 'itinerant' Europe that would go its own way after the end of the Cold War 
(Zoellick, 1990).  The purpose of the Bush administration's proposals was to link the US 
to the further evolution of European integration at a moment when the EC's internal 
market was being completed and the Intergovernmental Conferences of 1991 were about 
to create the legal basis for a European Union, including an Economic and Monetary 
Union and a Common Foreign and Security Policy.  As a result of the Bush 
Administration's efforts and the German proposal to formulate a joint declaration 
encompassing all the political, economic, technological and other aspects of the 
transatlantic partnership, a Declaration on EC-US relations was adopted in November 
1990 (Devuyst, 1990).  It provides for a flexible system of institutional contacts between 
the EC and the US. 
 
  During the first half of 1995, several--mainly European--decision-makers such 
as Alain Jupp‚, Malcolm Rifkind and Klaus Kinkel have been calling for a further 
strengthening of the bilateral EU-US relationship through the negotiation of a new 
Transatlantic Treaty or through the creation of a Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA).  
On 26 July 1995, the Commission adopted a strategy paper on EU-US relations that 
proposes the establishment of a Transatlantic Economic Space (Commission, 1995).  
Several reasons, that go beyond trade policy, have been advanced to support a 
reinvigoration of US-European ties.  On the one hand, with the end of the Cold War, the 
common enemy has disappeared, thus leading some observers to fear a loss of 'joint 
purpose' on the part of the transatlantic partners.  Most European politicians, however, 
are keen on maintaining the NATO defense guarantee and therefore want to reconfirm 
America's status as a 'European power'.  A Transatlantic Treaty, it is hoped, would ensure 
cooperation and consultation even if inward-looking tendencies in the US Congress gain 
in strength.  On the other hand, several European politicians seem worried about the shift 
in US attention toward the Americas and the Pacific.  Their idea is that the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Miami agreement to complete a free trade area in 
the Americas by 2005, and the agreement in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
framework to achieve free trade and investment by 2020, must be counterbalanced by the 
development of TAFTA. 
 
  While TAFTA would certainly solve most US-EC market access problems, the 
idea faces a number of serious problems.  First, TAFTA would need to conform to the 
WTO rules and it could be counterproductive if it gave developing countries the 
impression of the formation of a 'rich men's club', leaving the rest of the world behind.  In 
order to conform to WTO rules, free trade areas must cover 'substantially all trade'.  It is 
unlikely, however, that US and EC negotiators will in the near future be able to go much 
further in the liberalization of agricultural trade or audiovisual services transactions than 
what was achieved in the Uruguay Round.  Second, TAFTA, and certainly the creation of 
a Transatlantic Economic Space along the lines of the European Economic Area (EEA)4 
would imply a high degree of economic integration.  However, as Stephen Woolcock 
(1994) has demonstrated, the US and the European countries have developed different 
approaches to the role of the state in the economy and thus to the regulation of markets.   
 
  These approaches will not be easy to integrate.  Also, as Ronald A. Brand 
(1995) has pointed out, to be effective, the free movement of goods, services, capital and 
persons must be accompanied by the free movement of judgments through which 
property interests and their value are recognized and enforced in each geographic unit of 
the free trade system.  The Brussels Convention of 1968 on jurisdiction and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters accomplishes this task among the EC 
members.  The Lugano Convention of 1988 extends this system to the EFTA members.  
But there are substantial differences in US and European legal systems.  For instance, the 
differences in damages awards or in the allocation of litigation expenses will make the 
negotiation of a Transatlantic judgments recognition and enforcement system difficult.  
Third, trade relations cannot be isolated from macroeconomic and monetary policy.  It is 
unlikely that the US will soon be ready to return to a fixed exchange rate system of the 
Bretton Woods type.  But it will be extremely difficult, from a European point of view, to 
maintain a free trade regime with the US while the value of the dollar does not seem to be 
under control.  Fourth, giving structure to TAFTA or a Transatlantic Economic Space 
would also bring back sensitive institutional issues such as the US 'seat at the table' 
request.  As early as the 1970s, Henry A. Kissinger had tried in vain to obtain a formula 
whereby "as an old ally, the United States should be given an opportunity to express its 
concerns before final decisions affecting its interests are taken [by the Community]" 
(Kissinger, 1973). 
 
  By way of analogy, it is interesting to refer to the creation of the EEA.  Within 
the EEA, the participating EFTA members broadly have to follow the evolution of 
Community legislation, notable in internal market matters.  Though the EFTA members 
consequently wanted a say in the EC's decision-making, the Community wanted to 
prevent its legislative process from becoming a hostage to third country approval.  In the 
end, a formula was agreed to which distinguishes between decision shaping and decision-
taking.  While the EFTA countries are allowed to participate--via consultation and information procedures--in the decision-shaping phase of the EC's legislative process, 
final decision-taking is still reserved for the EU Council, without EFTA participation.  
An institutional deal with the US in the framework of a Transatlantic Economic Space 
would, no doubt, be even more complicated since it would require a more 'equal and 
reciprocal' relationship between the US and the EC.  Probably because of these problems, 
the Commission's strategy paper proposes a joint EU-US feasibility study in 1996 on the 
advantages and disadvantages of TAFTA, including the question of whether to make it 
open to third parties.  Meanwhile, the Commission advocates a 'building block approach' 
to the creation of a Transatlantic Economic Space.  This approach would include 
improving EU-US cooperation already under way in such areas as customs, science and 
technology, intellectual property, aviation, shipping, biotechnology, and competition 
policy.  It would also include identifying other sectors to be covered, among them 
difficult issues of regulatory cooperation and mutual recognition of testing and 
certification procedures in telecoms, electrical safety, etc. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
  Interdependence is certainly an accurate description of transatlantic economic 
ties.  In 1994, US merchandise exports to the EU-15 grew to $107.7 billion, and US 
imports from the EU-15 increased to a total of $119.4 billion.  This makes the EU the 
major export market for the US, absorbing 20 percent of total US exports.  Also, about 18 
percent of EU exports go to the US, making it the EU's largest single trading partner.  
Moreover, the EU accounts for 53 percent of total foreign direct investment in the US, 
while the US accounts for 42 percent of foreign direct investment in the EU.  It is also 
interesting to note that, over the years, the transatlantic trade balance has been more or 
less in balance, especially if compared with the persistently large trade deficits of both 
the EC and the US with Japan.  These figures are an indication of a largely healthy trade 
relationship.  They also put the relatively minor US-EC trade conflicts into their proper 
perspective.  
 
  Still, in view of Washington's insistence on market opening, trade skirmishes 
are likely to continue.  On the basis of the analysis presented above, the following points 
can be emphasized.  First, the US can be expected to continue a multi-track market 
opening policy that includes reliance on unilateral sanctions.  But the European view is 
that no one can claim the 'right' to impose a 'universally applicable' economic system on 
other countries.  Reliance on unilateral sanctions threatens to create a 'law of the jungle' 
mentality that is in total contradiction with the multilateral approach that led to the WTO 
and the streamlined WTO dispute settlement system.  This view explains the strong 
European reaction against the US announcement of unilateral sanctions against Japan in 
May 1995 in the auto and auto-parts dispute.  Secondly, even a more legalistic dispute 
settlement system (including perhaps sanctions against WTO members failing to make 
their trade practices conform with the multilateral rules) will not be sufficient to 
automatically resolve trade conflicts involving Community policies.  Such policies 
usually reflect a delicate balance between the interests of the various member states.  
Managing disputes will therefore continue to demand complex political negotiations, not 
only between the US and the EC, but also internally within the Community.  If the new WTO dispute settlement system should lead to a less compromising stance by the US, it 
could well cause major crises both between the EC and the WTO and within the EC.  
Third, since the much improved multilateral system does not yet cover the full range of 
international trade issues and does not include an effective 'early warning' mechanism 
signaling possible trade disputes, timely bilateral consultations will remain essential to 
foster prosperous trade flows and to pre-empt potential conflicts.  The experience of the 
relatively successful US monitoring of the internal market can prove useful in this regard.  
Also, the development of a Transatlantic Economic Space through a gradual building-
block approach could put a new economic and political dynamism in EU-US relations.  
One of the major problems with the bilateral approach is the recurring 'US seat at the 
table' demand, which is unacceptable to the Europeans. 
 
  From a European point of view, the transatlantic trade relationship will also be 
affected significantly by the further development of the European Union itself.  The EU 
is currently facing a series of major challenges that will determine its future, and 
therefore, also the degree to which it will be able to act as 'an equal partner' with the US 
in international trade issues and beyond.  The start of the final phase of Economic and 
Monetary Union by a core group of member states by the year 1999 would mark an 
economic as well as political point of no return in the journey toward 'an ever closer 
union'.  Also, a successful Intergovernmental Conference in 1996--one that would equip 
the Union with the necessary institutional framework to prevent the further enlargement 
of the EU from turning into a dilution exercise--is crucial for the Union's international 
standing  If, on the contrary, enlargement should lead to a Union characterized by 
paralysis and loss of purpose, the EU would have little to offer to the US.  In this 
perspective, it is also of major importance that the discussions on a Code of Conduct 
settling the EC's representation in the GATS and TRIPs issues do not undermine the 
unity of the Community in its external representation.  Any other outcome would mark a 
bad start for the cohesion and international position of the Union in the post-Uruguay 
Round era. 
 
1 It is the European Community, often described as the European Union's first pillar that 
is competent for external trade relations.  Only the EC, not the EU, has legal personality 
and the power to conclude treaties with third countries.  It is the EC that is a member of 
the World Trade Organization, not the EU.  This paper will therefore not refer to the EU 
but to the EC. 
 
2 From a theoretical point of view, the US shift toward a more aggressive and unilateral 
market opening policy is not surprising.  Once a dominant power no longer seems 
immune from the influences of the outside world and is on the way to becoming 'an 
ordinary country' (Rosecrance, 1976), it tends "to exploit both power and comparative 
advantage on a sector-by-sector basis" (Cafruny, 1985, 82).  In Stephen D. Krasner's 
words, the former hegemon has a strong tendency to try and realize short-term 
'consumption' goals rather than to work toward long-term systemic objectives (Krasner, 
1982, 33).  Thus "power resources not tapped by the hegemon-as-leader may be brought 
to bear by the hegemon-in-decline . . . .  Many regimes will therefore exhibit an inverse 
relationship between the decline of hegemony and the projection of power" (Cafruny, 
1985, 83).  The unilateral use of Section 301 trade sanctions is an example of this 
phenomenon. 
 
3 Each contracting party has a schedule of concessions that lists, on an item-by-item 
basis, the tariff concessions agreed to during GATT tariff negotiations.  Tariffs listed in 
the schedule are bound.  In accordance with GATT Article II, contracting parties 
undertake to levy no more than the tariff listed in the schedule on any particular item. 
 
4 The EEA that entered into force on 1 January 1994 basically extended the EC's internal 
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